With an increasing number of private toll road projects constructed or proposed in the U.S. through various forms of public private partnerships, and with more states removing legal constraints on the entry of private roads into the existing public road system, there are imperative needs to analyze the welfare and financial implications of utilizing private sector capitals in road financing for both public policy decisions and private investment decisions. This paper develops models of market entry, price, and capacity choices on mixed-ownership networks to address these research needs. A small-network equilibrium model enables theoretical analysis of welfare and financial effects of private toll roads on stylized parallel and serial networks, while an evolutionary simulation model is applicable to large real-world networks. The calibrated evolutionary model for the Twin Cities, Minnesota road network (7776 nodes, 20486 links) shows that under a free-entrance policy without any toll or capacity regulation on private roads, the private sector would invest $19.5 billion in the next 15 years to construct more than 400 lanekilometers of private freeways. The average annual rate of investment returns would be 18.2% for the private investors. The total social welfare would be improved by more than $6.7 billion, with only 16.4% of the welfare gains enjoyed by system users. The average toll on private roads would be $0.17/km, about seven times higher than that on public roads. Findings suggest that unleashing private sector investment resources alone can provide only one fourth of total new capacity needed to build our way out of congestion. In order to attract private sector investments, public policy makers do not have to, nor should they, guarantee short-term profits for private toll roads when there exist multiple private investment firms. Private investors can efficiently find optimal tolls and increase profits by making adjustments with adaptively-learned demand information.
Introduction
Currently in the U.S., almost all roads are publicly owned and operated. However, an increased involvement of the private sector in transportation network financing appears inevitable for several reasons: (1) Automobile travel demand is expected to continue growing at a fast pace in the foreseeable future by all forecasts; (2) The political unwillingness to increase gas tax or adopt innovative revenue schemes (e.g. congestion pricing) on a large scale, combined with inflation, has led to significant reductions of public transportation improvement funds in real dollar terms; (3) Transportation investment requirements are increasing due to the aging highway infrastructure and the fact that road construction costs have been increasing at a much higher rate than the consumer price index; (4) Private sector capital is readily available for transportation financing. According to the June 2006 U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) statistics, about 50% of current highway mega-projects (> $500million investment) in the country involve public-private partnerships (PPP). Various types of PPP options have been adopted in these private highway financing projects, including long-term lease to operate existing facilities (Chicago Skyway, Virginia Pocahontas Parkway, Indiana Toll Road System), capacity expansion and operation of existing facilities (Oregon's I-205, Texas's I-635), and construction and operation of new facilities (Dulles Greenway, California State Route 125, Texas State Highways 130, 161). Three private toll road projects have been proposed in Portland, OR (Sunrise Parkway, Newberg-Dundee Highway, and South I-205) and the pre-development phase approved in January 2006. A proposal of leasing the entire Illinois Toll Road System is currently being considered by the Illinois Legislature. The Los Angeles area has planned a privately-financed truck tollways to allow commercial trucks with higher values of time and higher values of reliability than passenger vehicles to bypass congestion on untolled routes. In summary, there is a large and increasing supply-demand gap in highway financing, and private sector investment resources can potentially fill this gap and at the same time bring economically more efficient pricing schemes to reality.
The primary hurdle to increased private sector involvements in transportation financing is the political and legal constraints in many states. Only a few states (Florida, Indiana, Texas, Utah and Virginia) have comprehensive laws permitting a board range of transportation PPP options, without restrictions as to mode, geographic area, and number of projects. However, this situation is changing as the level of congestion increases and more states start to realize the significant benefits private sector capital could bring to the transportation system and the economy. For instance, the recently passed State Senate Bill 772 and the legislature-mandated Oregon Innovative Partnerships Program will allow Oregon to actively explore private sector participation in transportation projects.
These recent developments in the U.S. suggest that there will be an increasing number of privately financed and operated roads in the future. These private roads will compete with the existing public roads using toll and capacity instruments, though the actual levels of toll and capacity will likely be regulated by a state legislature body. The existing and currently proposed PPP transportation projects have been developed on a case-by-case basis with negotiations between the state/local transportation authorities and the private investors. The public authorities' primary incentive is typically to utilize the private sector capital to fund capacity expansion or new highway projects that have been perceived as high priority investment needs. In the leasing-out case, the public authorities receive a large lump-sum payment from the private sector, which can be used to address other transportation funding needs. The private sector seeks to achieve a long term profit from its transportation investment. However, it is not clear how much these PPP projects would benefit the welfare of millions of travelers who are affected. Tolls charged on the PPP projects are usually regulated to prevent excess profit, while the welfare implications of such regulation are not very well understood. As the concept of PPP becomes increasingly popular, there is an important research question about how to optimally introduce and regulate private toll roads on real-world transportation networks. These important issues should be thoroughly studied and decision makers need to be informed about the full spatial (system-wide) and temporal (short and long term) impact of various policies regarding private toll roads. At a minimum, an analytical method that can evaluate alternative entrance and regulation policies should be developed and applied to assess the welfare and financial implications of unleashing private sector investment resources on real-world transportation networks. This research aims to provide such an analytical tool by developing a comprehensive model of transportation network evolution in the presence of pricing, capacity, and ownership dynamics.
As most transportation economists would agree, it is not straightforward to jointly consider pricing, capacity, and ownership dynamics on large networks. In reality, these three categories of decisions are usually made on different time scales. Solution algorithms developed to solve for the optimal pricing, or optimal investment strategies alone typically suffer from computational complexity issues in large-scale applications. The introduction of an ownership dimension, which is necessary to study the welfare impact of private toll roads, implies the presence of both welfare-maximizing and profit-maximizing objectives in the modeling process with the possibility of additional regulatory constraints. In terms of research design, this paper attempts to overcome these difficulties by first ignoring the issue of disparate time scales and focusing on the price and capacity decisions of private and public roads on stylized small networks. An equilibrium model is developed for the simplest parallel and serial networks, and solved for a numerical example. While the equilibrium model cannot be solved efficiently on large networks, certain simplifying assumptions based on the observations of real-world PPP projects can be made. These assumptions, combined with insights obtained from the equilibrium model, have enabled the development of an evolutionary simulation model of pricing, investment, and ownership dynamics that is applicable to large real-world networks, which is demonstrated in a study of a particular regulation package on private toll roads on the Twin Cities, Minnesota road network (7776 nodes, 20486 links).
With few exceptions, most previous studies have considered transportation network pricing, investment, and ownership structures separately, which are reviewed in the following section. Section 3 develops the equilibrium model which considers both users' choices (trip frequency, departure time, and route choices) and private/public road owners' choices (price and capacity), and solves the traffic, price, and capacity equilibria for two stylized mixed-ownership networks. Section 4 develops the evolutionary model of price, capacity, and ownership dynamics on large networks. Section 5 applies the evolutionary model to the Twin Cities networks and presents the results under a specific entrance and regulation policy on private toll roads. Section 6 offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.
Literature Review
Transportation economists have long been investigating various road pricing policies for the optimal allocation of scarce road resources, primarily from a theoretical framework (Dupuit 1844 , Pigou 1920 , Knight 1924 , Mohring and Harwitz 1962 , Vickery 1963 , Walters 1968 , Small 1992 , Arnott et al. 1993 , Button and Verhoef 1998 , Gomez-Ibanez 1999 , de Palma and Lindsey 2002 , Verhoef 2002 . The economic theory also suggests that the optimal level of road investment is to expand a road to the point that the cost of one additional unit of capacity just equals the benefits it brings. An important finding, due to Mohring and Harwitz (1962) , states that the revenue generated from the optimal pricing scheme is just sufficient to finance the optimal level of capacity under certain conditions. A series of studies have examined the validity of this "self-financing rule", which are summarized by Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) . However, the theoretical analyses are typical performed under a strict set of economic conditions which, in some cases, hardly correspond to reality. Some have concerns that the revenue collected from short-run marginal cost pricing schemes may either significantly exceed or fall short of long-run cost of facility supply for reasons with regard to economies of scale and nonoptimality of existing road capacity (Walters 1968 , Gwilliam 1997 . While the majority of road pricing literature considers a network of parallel roads, several studies examine revenue choices on a serial network managed by multiple jurisdictions (Levinson 1999 (Levinson , 2000 .
While pricing policies are typically proposed with the goal of improving short-run network efficiency, studies on investment principles are generally concerned with long-run efficiency assuming a priori the pricing policy (Wohl and Hendrickson 1984) . Previous research on the network design problem (NDP) seeks to find the optimal network that serves a certain travel demand, or the optimal network enhancement given a budget constraint (Boyce et al. 1974 , LeBlanc 1975 , Poorzahedy and Turnquist 1982 , Yang and Bell 1998 , Meng et al. 2001 . However, these studies, focusing on investment only, do not address the conflict between longrun economic efficiency and financial feasibility in reality. Benefit-cost analysis has been extensively used in practice for strategic planning. Decision-makers have also developed practical investment rules dealing with problems of concern, most notably congestion, such as bottleneck removal and bottleneck bypassing (Zhang and Levinson 2005) .
Aside from the large body of literature on road pricing and strategic investment, the third aspect of transportation financing deals with ownership structure. Discussions in this field focus on transportation commercialization and privatization. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) have reviewed transportation privatization at an empirical level, though the cases of roadway privatization are few and not entirely successful. It is unlikely that even if roadways were privatized, that their price structure would be left entirely to the private sector. Roth (1996) reviewed positive aspects of road commercialization and privatization, and proposed a framework for creating a market economy of roads. In many ways, roadways are natural monopolies, as their provision and use has a declining average cost (aside from congestion effects). The relative advantages and disadvantages of various ownership regimes may also depend on the type of regulation (Kahn 1988 , Train 1991 . Winston and Shirley (1998) develop a quantitatively model to study the welfare effects of transportation privatization with emphasis on the transit system.
Most previous economic studies consider the aforementioned three policy aspects (pricing, investment and ownership) of transportation network evolution separately with a few exceptions. Keeler and Small (1977) developed a theoretical model to examine optimal peak-load pricing and investment on urban expressways. Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) recently revisited this topic with additional considerations of second-best pricing policies. Several studies consider alternative ownership regimes and toll choices on a small network with one OD pair and two or more alternative routes (DeVany and Saving 1980 , de Palma 1992 , Viton 1995 , Verhoef et al. 1996 , de Palma and Lindsey 2000 . It appears that no previous study has considered pricing, investment and ownership issues jointly on hypothetical or real-world networks.
There are also different methodological tools which could be used to model transportation network dynamics. Following the seminal work by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) , most economic studies on road pricing and financing adopt a theoretical framework and base the analysis on small hypothetical networks, which may be labeled as small network (equilibrium) models. Models of the transportation network as a physical system have been well developed in the transportation literature (Sheffi 1985) . When there are multiple agents making pricing and investment decisions (e.g. private roads competing with public roads), an economic network arises which considers coordination and competition between decision-makers. Johansson et al. (1994) describe various economic networks from an empirical viewpoint, while Nagurney (1993) provides a computational framework, which links analysis of economic networks (suppliercustomer relationships) with algorithms developed for the analysis of physical networks. Economides (1996) compares the economic structure of networks with vertically related industries. Economic systems with multiple decision-making agents may not contain a neat equilibrium solution. Game theory Morgenstern 1944, de Palma 1992) provides an alternative means for capturing the interactions between agents in deciding prices and investments. A modeling approach using cellular automata (Langton 1989) suggests specifying simple rules and allowing the system to evolve. The transportation system is, in Sussman's (2000) word, a complex, large, integrated, and open system. Modeling tools developed for analyzing complex systems, such as agent-based techniques (von Neumann 1966, Zhang and Levinson 2004) , may also be used to model pricing, capacity, and ownership dynamics.
The representations of travel demand pattern and cost structure on transportation networks are fundamental to transportation economic analysis. Users in the transportation systems make a number of spatial and temporal choices that affect travel demand: residential and job locations, vehicle ownership, activity location, activity participation, timing, duration, trip chaining, travel mode, and routes. Traditionally, these choices are modeled in a sequential manner with trips as the basic analysis units, while integrated models have also received significant research interests (Boyce 2002) . New activity-based approaches have also emerged since a major breakthrough in behavioral geography in the 1970s (Hagerstrand 1970 ) , and have been applied to aid transportation planning (Pas 1985 , Kitamura 1988 , Jones 1990 , Axhausen and Gärling 1992 . In transportation economics studies, the problem of road pricing has been traditionally set up for simplicity with route choice and origin-destination travel frequency choice being the only two demand dimensions. Recently, several studies also consider departure time choice, employing Vichrey's (1969) bottleneck model (Bernstein and Muller 1993 , Braid 1996 , Liu and McDonald 1999 , de Palma and Lindsey 2000 . Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) developed an analytical model with vehicle ownership as one of the endogenous variables.
The cost of supplying road capacity usually involves land acquisition, construction, and maintenance cost (Keeler and Small 1977, Zhang and Levinson 2005) . Empirical studies of highway construction costs focus on the issue of whether the actual cost function exhibits constant returns to scale for its theoretical importance (Keeler and Small 1977 , Krause 1981 , Small et al. 1989 , Levinson and Gillen 1998 , Small 1999 , Levinson and Yerra 2002 . Recently, Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003) have estimated the construction cost function based on project-level data in the Twin Cities.
An Equilibrium Model of Pricing, Capacity Choice and Ownership Structure
The analysis in this section considers departure time, route, and trip frequency choices with a flat toll, optimal capacity choices, and alternative ownership regimes. Although the assumption of a flat toll corresponds to the current practice, it underestimates the effectiveness of road pricing with dynamic tolls varying with traffic conditions (de Palma and Lindsey 2000).
Demand Side: Models of Road Users
Departure Time Choice Vickrey (1969) derives the departure time equilibrium with flat tolls and the duration of the departure period (i
is determined by the total number of users or total flow (f) and road capacity (F):
Total travel cost (U) excluding toll (τ) for each user is comprised of three parts: free-flow travel cost (γ·T * ), queuing delay (D q ), and schedule delay (D s ). A summary of notation is given in appendix A. Throughout this chapter, superscripts are indexes and subscripts denote first-order (partial) derivatives.
Let i * and i denote the desired and actual arrival times respectively, where i * is further assumed to be the same for all users. A piece-wise linear schedule delay cost function is then specified where α and β are coefficients.
At the departure time equilibrium, all drivers using the same route should experience the same total travel cost (U * ) whenever they depart. It is convenient to consider the earliest driver and the latest drivers as their queuing delays are both zero.
Solve equation system (1), (3) and (4) and the following expression of travel cost under departure time equilibrium is derived:
The second term of equation (5) is the sum of queuing cost and schedule delay cost under departure time equilibrium, which is proportional to total number of users and inversely proportional to road capacity. In contrast, the classic BPR function raises the ratio of f/F to the power of four (BPR 1964) . It is possible to use empirically derived schedule delay functions, such as the one developed in Small (1982) , to specify the coefficients in equation (5). There is also a more fundamental difference between equation (5) and the BPR function. The BPR flowtravel-time function is often regarded as a supply side equation in transportation economics, while equation (5) is derived from user departure time choices and a given road capacity.
Route Choice and Trip Frequency Choice
Two small networks are considered in this study so that the equilibrium network properties can be examined for parallel and serial networks (see Figure 1 ). Different analytical route choice models exist with various assumptions about route choice behavior and are summarized in Sheffi (1985) . Let C denote the total travel cost including toll, and q 12 the total number of users between origin-destination pair 1-2. For the parallel network ( Figure 1a ), the Wardrop route choice equilibrium conditions are:
By assuming a demand curve to describe trip frequency choices, we also have the following equilibrium demand expression, where P(.) is the inverse demand function:
Similar route choice equilibrium conditions and equilibrium demand expressions can be derived for the serial network with three OD pairs and three inverse demand. It is assumed that there is no OD substitutional effect, i.e. demand functions for different OD pairs are independent of each other. 
Supply Side: Road Provision Cost
It is fair to conclude from the studies on road construction cost reviewed in Section 2 that the overall empirical evidence does not strongly disagree with the proposition that road construction cost exhibits approximately constant returns to scale. With constant returns to scale, the average amortized cost of providing a unit of capacity (S) is simply a constant:
Ownership and Policies: Models of Road Providers
Two types of road owners are considered, public and private. Each road owner sets prices and chooses capacity to build based on a pre-determined goal. It is assumed that private road authorities maximize profit, and public road authorities maximize social welfare without budget constraint or discounting.
The general welfare function for a network growth process over a period of time is:
Where b, q, and a are indices OD pairs, users of an OD pair, and roads respectively, and delta indicates capacity changes. The first term is users' willingness to pay. The second term is user cost including toll. The third term is total revenue for the facility provider, and the last term is facility provision cost. A private road company simply maximizes total profits that are produced from all roads it owns:
Since there are only two roads for the parallel and the serial network studied in this section, there is only one possible mixed ownership regimes: Public-Private. We also consider a based scenario wherein both roads are publicly owned with no tolls and optimal capacity, and a benchmark scenario wherein total welfare is maximized with socially optimal capacity and optimal toll on both roads. A measure of economic efficiency can be defined as the ratio of actual welfare gain against the base case to the maximum possible welfare gain.
Solution Algorithm for the Equilibrium Model
The task of finding the equilibrium toll and capacity is a nonlinear programming problem for ownership regimes with only one authority managing all roads, and a game theoretical problem with both public and private roads. Previous studies have developed algorithms to solve the equilibrium toll with fixed capacity (de Palma 1992 , de Palma and Lindsey 2000 , Verhoef 2002 , among many others). Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) developed an algorithm to solve another formulation of the optimal toll and capacity choice problem with endogenous vehicle ownership. For the nonlinear programming problem with the objective function defined by equation (8), we take advantage of the equality constraints defined by equations (5) and (6) and solve for the Lagrangian stationary points. Non-negativity constraints are then checked at the stationary points. For the game-theoretical problem, we derive the pure strategy Nash equilibrium necessary conditions (i.e. first-order necessary conditions) based on the two objective functions (equations (8) and (9)), and form a system of non-linear equations by combining the first order conditions with user equilibrium conditions (equations (5) and (6)). The solution to this equation system is a stationary point for the original game theoretical problem. If there are multiple stationary points, values of the objective functions will be evaluated at all stationary points and the global optimum identified. This algorithm works well for the two small networks, but is impractical for applications on large networks (even the two-link serial network resulted in a system of 13 nonlinear equations).
The equilibrium tolls under mixed ownership can be expressed as closed form functions of the equilibrium capacity and demand elasticities. For the parallel network (A: Public; B: Private) (Previous studies have derived this, e.g. Verhoef et al. 1996, de Palma and Lindsey 2000) :
For the serial network:
Where c 1 ~ c 6 are the absolute values of various demand elasticities, and U f (first order derivative of user cost with respect to flow) is also non-negative: An interesting observation is that when the private roads charge tolls higher than the marginal cost (f•U), the public road should charge tolls higher (lower) than the marginal cost on the parallel (serial) network to maximize welfare. The optimal capacity, however, has to be solved numerically under pure or mixed ownership.
A Numerical Example
The setup of the numerical example is described in Appendix A. This numerical example is constructed to demonstrate the solution algorithm on the two stylized networks, and to gain some insights into the efficiency of a network with mixed ownership. It is not intended to replicate any real-world decision scenarios, which is the task of the next section of the paper. Results from the numerical analysis are summarized in Table 1 . The base case (no toll, optimal capacity) assumes that the construction expenditure comes from other revenue sources (negative public "Excess revenue") and is not paid by the road users. This is why changes in consumers' surplus in all other scenarios are negative. The assumption of constant returns to scale in road construction ensures that the public excess revenue is always zero in the socially optimal case (toll revenue just repays construction costs). In both networks, the private sector significantly under-built capacity while charging significantly higher tolls than the optimal, even though the level of congestion (measured by V/C ratios) on private roads is only slightly better than the socially optimal case. Mixed ownership is economically very efficient on the parallel network (0.93) when there exists a public competitor, but only moderately efficient (0.47) on the serial network where the private road is a spatial monopoly. But even on the serial network, mixed ownership is more efficient than the base scenario. The high investment return (116%) suggests that a private road monopoly needs to be regulated. The lower return for the private road (22%) with a public competitor appears not too outrageous. When the level of optimal public road capacity is examined under mixed ownership (compare Road A capacity under "Public-Private" and "Optimal"), it is interesting that the introduction of private roads not only relieves the public sector from constructing new capacity (Road B), but also reduces the capacity expansion needs on the existing public roads (Road A).
In general, results from this numerical example are in favor of private toll roads. However, it is unclear to what extent these findings hold on large real-world networks where private roads would have more complex substitutional and complementary relationships with existing public roads. The following section develops an evolutionary model to explore this issue.
An Evolutionary Model of Pricing, Capacity, and Ownership Dynamics
This section develops an evolutionary model with component demand, cost and policy modules individually specified and calibrated for the road network in the Twin Cities, Minnesota. The modeling framework is presented in Figure 2 which considers the evolution of price competition, capacity choice, and ownership dynamics over time. According to the existing and anticipated travel demand patterns and cost estimates, the private sector decides whether or not to invest in candidate private toll road projects, chooses a long-run profit-maximizing capacity level if an entry decision is made, and determine the short-run profit-maximizing tolls on private roads. An existing private toll road can change its toll and capacity levels adaptively based on profit objectives and under all applicable regulatory policies. A public road authority (e.g. State DOT) operates all existing public roads, and makes its own pricing and investment decisions. A regulator (e.g. State Legislature) enacts policies regarding the entries and operations of private toll roads.
Different from the previous equilibrium analysis, transportation network dynamics are now modeled over time. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the time scales on which various pricing, capacity, and market entry decisions are made. It is assumed that all these investor and operator decisions are revisited once a year with rationales explained in the following sections.
Also distinct from the equilibrium analysis, the development of the evolutionary model attempts to accurately forecast welfare and financial consequence of private toll roads on real-world networks. This requires all component demand, cost, and policy models be either empirically calibrated and verified, or at least based on the best available real-world observations. 
Demand Side: Four-Step Model
A traditional four-step model, based on the Twin Cities metropolitan planning model, is adopted to model travel demand responses to tolls and congestion. The advantage is that the model coefficients, such as those charactering the trip generation, gravity model, and volume-delay functions, have all been empirically derived and verified in many previous planning studies. The running time of the four-step model on the Twin Cities with an improved user equilibrium assignment algorithm is also acceptable for the purpose of this study with reasonable traffic equilibration criteria. The model also has several limitations. Unlike an integrated land use and transportation model, this standard travel demand model does not consider land use dynamics due to population and economics growth, or due to accessibility changes. It is assumed that land use will increase uniformly throughout the metropolitan area in the future, which implies a uniform network-wide traffic growth rate. The traffic growth rate is assumed to be three percent per year throughout all models and computations in this section. Another limitation is the assumption of homogenous users in the four-step model. This homogeneity assumption could lead to underestimation of the welfare benefit of tolling on private or public roads, as demonstrated in several previous studies (Arnott et al. 1992 , Schmanske 1993 , Small and Yan 2001 . Unfortunately, there is not a demand model with heterogeneous users developed and calibrated for the Twin Cities at this time.
Supply Side: Road Construction and Maintenance Costs
Road construction and maintenance costs are modeled separately. The specification of the construction cost function is based on recent empirical findings in Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003) , who estimated a Cobb-Douglas cost function based on more than 100 recent highway construction projects in the Twin Cities. There findings suggest that the cost structure exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to lane miles of construction, and it is more expansive to construct higher level roads (often with higher level of existing capacity). The following specification captures these effects by incorporating kilometers of roadway construction (l), additional capacity added (F t+1 -F t ), existing road capacity (F t ), and a technology factor (ø), where t is the index of time. ( ) ( ) ( )
Few academic studies have empirically estimated the maintenance cost of individual facilities. We assume that it depends on the length, and the capacity of the specific road. Furthermore, it is assumed that maintenance cost has constant returns to scale with respect to length, and decreasing returns to scale with respect to capacity (1.25). The technology factor (μ) is adjusted so that the total base year maintenance cost matches the total 2005 preservation and maintenance costs estimated by the Minnesota DOT. 
Price and Capacity Choices of the Public Sector
Users of existing public roads pay fuel taxes, vehicle sales and registration taxes, and driver license fees, and even general taxes for travel. According to the 2005 MnDOT budget, 47% of its revenue is generated by fuel taxes (state and federal), while 89% of the total revenue is spent on roadway projects. We convert all fuel taxes (40.4 cent per gallon) to a distance-based toll based on an average automobile fuel efficiency of 20.8 mpg (2004 national average), which is then multiplied by 1.89 (89/47) to reflect the revenue mechanism for public roads in the Twin Cities. This produces an equivalent per-kilometer price of 2.3 cents.
The actual investment rule for road construction projects in the Twin Cities are complicated and often political, and summarized in a recent review study . It involves a distributed multi-criteria ranking process, with the objectives of reducing congestion, improving safety, and gaining local government support. Benefit cost analysis is typical for major investment projects. In this paper, we assume that revenue generated from the above average pricing policy is used to expand the links with the highest benefit cost ratios until its exhaustion or until all remaining projects have benefit cost ratios less than one. The method for computing the benefit cost ratios of expanding each road in the network is the same as that in Zhang and Levinson (2005a, b) .
Market Entry, Price, and Capacity Choices of the Private Sector

Regulatory Policy
A private investor's decisions on market entry, toll, and private road capacity obviously depend on the legal and regulatory constraints, which need to be defined in the model. Results from the equilibrium model in Section 3 show that a private toll road can be very efficient (as measured by welfare standards) when there is a parallel public road, even though the private road toll and capacity are not regulated. Therefore, we define the simplest possible regulatory policy to study the welfare impact of private toll roads: (1) The private sector can only construct and operate toll roads with parallel alternative public roads, while the public alternative road will not be expanded for at least ten years; (2) The private sector can only invest on new limited-access freeway capacity since no state currently has deployed technology to enable tolling on local arterial streets; (3) There is no restriction on market entry or a limit on the number of private toll road projects each year; (4) There is no regulation on price or capacity. However, the structure of the proposed evolutionary model is flexible enough to evaluate other regulatory policies or contracting agreements such as price ceiling, profit cap, and limits on the rate of investment return.
Market Entry
Private investment companies interested in transportation financing will base their market entry decisions on the estimated returns of investment of individual private road projects. There are 1363 limited freeway links on the road network, which implies 1363 possible private road projects. In real-world decision situations, the investors should be able to eliminate a large number of feasible but non-profitable projects with statistics such as the current and future levels of congestion on the existing public roads. Their market entry decisions are modeled using a normative approach in this paper. The total profit a private investor can expect from a specific private road project a is:
T is the expected life span of the project. The first term is the total revenue, the second term construction cost according to equation (11-1), and the third term maintenance cost according to equation . λ is the discount factor so that the profit is expressed as the present value. It is assumed that T = 30 years, and the discount rate is 10% which defines discount factors in all years. The life span of a private toll road should be the minimum of the structural life and the concession period. For instance, the concession period is 30 years for Route-3 in Massachusetts, 35 years for SR-125 in California, 42.5 years for the Dulles Greenway in Washington, DC, and 99 years for Route-895 in Virginia (FHWA 2006) .
The maximum profit can be obtained at the optimal private road capacity (F a 0 ), and optimal tolls (τ a t ) in all future years within the life span of the project, subject to: (1). the future travel demand; and (2) the capacity and price choices of the parallel public freeway which are both fixed based on the public pricing policy specified in Section 4.3 and the aforementioned regulatory policy. Recall that in Section 3 when the private and public roads both compete with price and capacity instruments, a game theoretical problem is obtained. With the public pricing policy and the regulatory policy specified, the game theoretical problem which is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to solve on large network drops to a non-linear optimization problem with a single objective (using b to indicate the parallel public freeway):
Subject to: Equation Set (6) for each future year within T (Traffic equilibrium between parallel private and public freeways) Equation Set (11) (Construction and maintenance cost functions)
Based on the results from the equilibrium model in Section 3, we develop the following algorithm to solve this maximization problem within the framework of the evolutionary model:
Step 1: Substitute construction and maintenance cost functions into the objective functions;
Step 2: Use Equation (10-2) to write τ a t as a function of F a 0 . Note that Equation (10-2) still holds even when the parallel public freeway is not charging the welfare-maximizing toll (see details in Zhang and Levinson 2006) . This guarantees the traffic equilibrium conditions. After this transformation, the original problem becomes an unconstrained single variable (F a 0 ) maximization problem;
Step 3: The demand elasticity term (c 1 ) in Equation (10-2) needs to be estimated. It determines the sensitivity of total traffic flows on the parallel private and public freeways to prices. The initial demand elasticities in the base year are computed by raising the equivalent distance-based toll on all existing freeways by 1% and observe the resulting changes in travel demand. In each future year, the demand elasticity estimates are updated as new tolls are set by the private roads and new traffic flows are obtained. The optimization problem herein is solved based on the available elasticity estimates at the time of market entry decisions.
Step 4: The unconstrained single-variable maximization problem is solved by a standard linesearch method with multiple initial trial solutions, and the maximum profit from the particular project is evaluated at the optimal future tolls and optimal immediate capacity level.
Step 5: The same algorithm is implemented to solve all 1363 (1363 possible projects) market entry problems.
This algorithm is very efficient because the evaluation of objective function values for the linesearch method does not involve any iterative procedures. Once the expected profits and immediate investment requirements (the construction costs) are determined, the rates of investment return on all candidate private toll road projects can be computed. The private investment companies (modeled as a collective whole) will construct a private toll road if the investment return rate is higher than that of all alternative investment opportunities (assumed to be 6%).
Capacity Choice
It is assumed that once a market entry decision is made, a private toll road will be constructed and becomes operational in the next year (i.e. one-year design-build time). As travel demand grows and the private toll roads learn more information about the "actual" (in the model) demand elasticities, they may be expanded by the investor if capacity expansion is profitable. This dynamic capacity choice of private toll roads is considered by solving the same profitmaximizing problem (13) in the "Market Entry" section for all existing private toll roads. If the new optimal capacity is higher than the current capacity, and if the return rate of the additional capacity investment is higher than the base rate (6%), the particular private toll road will be expanded to the new optimal capacity. However, both the initial construction and subsequent expansion decisions are irreversible even if a private road is loosing money. Although new capacity choices can be made at any time, it is assumed that they are considered once a year by the private investor because the public sector at most updates its transportation investment plan once a year.
Toll Choice
A new private toll road will charge the optimal first-year toll based on the solutions to the market-entry optimization problem (13) during its first year of operation. However, the initially assumed demand elasticity for solving the optimal toll is unlikely to correspond to future demand patterns. Private toll roads can maximize their profits by learning demand responses adaptively as they accumulate data on previous tolls and previous traffic flows. It is assumed that private toll roads use historical toll (price) and flow (quantity) information up to five years back to estimate the underlying demand curves using a standard quadratic line-fitting technique. Using only the previous-year data will not fully utilize the information available, while using very old data may backfire as the demand curve itself for any individual road in a network shifts constantly. The causes of demand curve shifts include background traffic growth, new toll choices on other roads, and new capacity expansions on other roads.
Instead of using the optimal toll equation (10-2), which only considers the substitutional effect between parallel private and public freeways, to compute the constantly changing optimal tolls, private roads with learned knowledge about demand curves can adjust its existing tolls by transforming the demand curves (f(τ)) into profit curves (π(τ)), and identifying the profitmaximizing tolls for the next year. This is similar to the adaptive price adjustment process on a completely private road network in Zhang and Levinson (2005a) .
This adaptive learning process of private toll roads has been observed in reality. For instance, when the Dulles Greenway in Washington, DC opened in 1995, the one-way toll was $1.75 per vehicle, but when traffic fell short of projected levels, the toll was reduced to $1.00. This attracted more users but did not increase profit. Therefore, the toll was increased again to $1. 
Summary of the Evolutionary Model
A salient feature of the evolutionary model developed in this section is that all agents (users, private and public roads, and possibly regulators) make decisions and adjustments adaptively according to others' decisions. The transportation network evolves as the agents interact on certain time scales and under certain decision rules. The transition from a pure-ownership (public) to a mixed-ownership network (public and private) can be observed over time in the model, as various travel, price, capacity, and market entry decisions are made. Clearly, the private toll roads have incentives to gather information and have been modeled with learning capabilities. The public sector is typically slower in responding to changing conditions and modeled with politically correct pricing and investment rules. A specific regulatory scheme on private toll roads is used to test the proposed model, while the model is capable of assessing other regulatory and contracting policies with regard to public private partnerships. When applied to the Twin Cities network, we found that computationally, the most time consuming part is the repeated applications (one run for each modeled year) of the four-step travel demand model in the evolutionary process. Those who can accept the running time of the existing travel demand models should find this evolutionary model only moderately more inconvenient. Public or private agencies interested in applications of the proposed model for policy or project analysis only need to collect reliable information about road construction and maintenance costs, as most urban areas in the U.S. have an operational travel demand model.
Welfare and Financial Effects of Private Toll Roads
The evolutionary model of network price, capacity, and ownership dynamics has been implemented on the Twin Cities network to evaluate the welfare and financial implications of unleashing private sector investment resources. The word "unleashing" is chosen because the model currently consists of a free entrance policy and no regulation on toll or capacity which should maximize private sector participation. We simulate the evolution of the network with the calibrated demand, cost, and policy models for a 15-year period from 2006~2020 in the Twin Cities. In the based year 2006, all roads are public (thin black lines). Following the opening of the road market to the private sector in the base year, a total of 435 lane-kilometers of private toll road would have been constructed by year 2020. Figure 3 illustrates the locations of these private toll roads (thick red lines). Their locations do not always overlap with the most congested freeway bottlenecks identified in the Twin Cities by MnDOT, as the prohibitive construction cost at certain bottlenecks may render private toll projects unprofitable or less profitable than other investment opportunities. It is interesting to note that based on a novel formulation of the optimal network design problem, Davis and Sanderson (2001) estimate that in order to build our way out of congestion in the Twin Cities (i.e. all freeways operate at level of service C or higher), adding 1,844 lane-kilometers of new freeways would be needed to accommodate the travel demand predicted for the year 2020.
A comparison between their estimate and the result herein suggests that even with profit levels largely unregulated, it should not be expected that the private sector investment resources alone will solve the congestion problem (they provide only one forth of the total capacity needed). The current and future urban land use characteristics, travel demand patterns, and facility supply cost together have determined that rational private investors will intentionally keep congestion at a certain level to achieve short-and long-run profit-maximizing objectives. This finding from the evolutionary model is consistent with the equilibrium model in Section 3 which shows that the private sector tends to under-build capacity and over-charge users (see Table 1 in Section 3). It should also be noted that even the socially optimal solution does not imply zero congestion, as we shall see later in this section. There are "optimal" levels of congestion for the private and public sectors respectively.
The evolution of private road toll and capacity is shown in Figure 4 . As the overall travel demand grows at three percent per year, more and more private toll road projects would become profitable, as demonstrated by a steady increase in the total lane-kilometers of private toll roads. The profile of the average per-km toll of all private toll roads tells an interesting story. Recall that the initial toll for the first-year of operation of any new private road is computed from the equilibrium toll equation, which only considers the competition between the private road and its parallel public freeway. That simplification results in an overestimation of the optimal toll level, as there are other public roads (i.e. arterial roads and parallel freeways further away) competing with the private road. However, by learning the actual travel demand responses, private roads in the model adjust their average toll from $0.20/km to about $0.15/km in six years. Eventually, the growing level of congestion will take effect and lead to a steady increase of the profitmaximizing toll level for private roads. Over the 15-year period, the average private road toll ($0.17/km) is about seven times of the equivalent distance-based toll ($0.023/km) on public roads. The crucial factor that determines the private sector's interests in road financing and the public sector's regulation on private roads is the profitability of private roads. There are many examples of regulations on private tolls, rate of investment returns, and risk sharing agreements between public and private entities when the profit level falls short of expectation. For instance, when increasing tolls to the maximum publicly-acceptable level still cannot produce profitable revenue streams in the opening years of the Dulles Greenway, the Virginia General Assembly allowed the speed limit to be increased from 55 to 65 miles per hour, and approved an extension of the concession period for an additional 20 years. We calculate the annual profit for a private toll road using the difference between the annual revenue and the sum of the annual maintenance cost and the amortized construction cost. Results plotted in Figure 5 are against policies that provide subsidies or have provisions to increase the profit levels of private toll roads during the early years of their concession periods. The nature of annual traffic growth and the investor's tendency to initially charge higher-than-optimal tolls together determine that many private roads will operate at a deficit in their early years. According to the model, in 2006 just above half of all new private toll roads in the Twin Cities could make profits. However, over time an increasing percentage of private roads will start to see positive cash flows, and eventually make significant long-term profits. Our calculations actually show that the average private road in the Twin Cities constructed in the next 15 years would provide an 18.2% of annual investment returns for the private investors over the assumed 30-year concession period.
Public policy makers may be concerned that negative cash flows in early years of toll road operations would deter the private sector capital from entering the road market. However, our results show that as long as the private investors are interested in long-term profits, $19.5 billion of private investments could be attracted to the Twin Cities under a free-entry minimumregulation policy from 2006 to 2020, even though 51% toll roads would loose money in 2006 and 12% would still loose money in 2020. To request immediate profits on private toll road projects is an unreasonable request and should not be granted. Some might argue that without positive cash flows, the private sector will simply wait until the overall demand (or congestion) level is sufficiently high. This is a legitimate argument if there is only one private sector monopoly who obviously has recall privilege, i.e. this sole investor can revisit a toll road project anytime in the future without worrying about it being otherwise constructed. However, there is competition between multiple private sector firms in real-world scenarios. For instance, FHWA has identified at least five U.S. and five foreign firms who are exploring or in the process of setting up infrastructure investment funds (FHWA 2006) . Recent toll road projects in Portland, Oregon have also received multiple bids. When competition exists among multiple firms, they should be willing to commit in toll road projects as long as their long term profit-generating value significantly exceed the amount of investment. It is, therefore, recommended that toll road policies for large-scale implementations be forged based on long-term profits and risks, not on short-term gains and fluctuations.
The welfare impact of allowing the free entrance of private toll roads in the Twin Cities is summarized in Figure 6 . The socially optimal welfare is computed with assumptions of marginal cost tolls on all roads, and investment rules based on system-wide benefit cost analysis. "No private investment" is based on the equivalent distance-based toll, and the benefit cost analysis for project selection described in Section 4.3, which replicates the status quo of public road financing. The third scenario, "free entry of private", is presented in Section 4.4. There would be a $6.7 billion total welfare gain the in the next 15 years ($1.4 billion/year gain in 2020 alone), if private sector investment resources are allowed to freely enter the road market without any toll or capacity regulation as long as each private toll road has a parallel public freeway. As previously mentioned, the average rate of annual investment return for the private investors is 18.2%. It is coincident that the regulated maximum rate of private investment return is 18% for the Dulles Greenway, and 18.5% for California SR-125 (FHWA 2006) . However, results from the evolutionary model also show that at this level of investment return (and its implied levels of toll and capacity), only 16.4% of the welfare gain is distributed to the users, while the private investors' profits contribute to the majority of the net social benefit. This raises the issue of optimal regulation on private toll roads, which should be explored in future research.
Conclusions
From a broad systems perspective, an increased involvement of private sector investment resources in transportation financing implies the transfer of private sector capitals from other investment opportunities in the economy to the transportation sector, and the relief of scarce government transportation funds for other needed transportation projects. It has often been argued that when there exists an appropriate level of competition, the private sector is intrinsically more efficient than the public sector in the provision and operation of traditionally publicly-provided services. In the case of transportation, private roads with profit incentives are more likely to impose congestion-sensitive tolls, which may be more efficient than the existing average pricing schemes through fuel taxes. Although Europe and several developing countries have long been utilizing private funds in road financing, elected transportation officials in the U.S., facing a public funding gap between stagnate fuel tax revenues and ever-increasing investment needs, have just started tapping into the private sector capital by allowing direct private investment and operations, or by issuing bonds backed by toll revenues. The recent emergence of more than a dozen public-private-partnerships toll-road projects across the U.S. suggests a positive momentum, and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Congestion Initiative Program has called for "unleashing private sector investment resources". An increasing number of states have removed or in the process of removing legal constraints on private toll roads.
There are imperative needs to study the welfare impact of policy packages targeted at private toll roads for the society as a whole, and the financial implications for private investors and public road authorities. This paper addresses these needs by theorizing and modeling the price, capacity, and market entry decisions of private toll roads when they compete with existing public roads on real-world networks. Both the analytical findings and application results are in favor of introducing private toll roads to public road systems characterized by growing congestion, insufficient public funding, and inefficient pricing practices. By analyzing a hypothetical BuildOperate-and-Transfer privatization scenario with no market-entry, pricing, or capacity regulations on new private freeways (which compete with existing public freeways) in the Twin Cities, Minnesota, the analysis estimates that during the period from 2006 to 2020, $19.5 billion of private sector investments would build 435 lane-kilometers of private tollways, which would provide an 18.2% annual investment return for the private investors, and $6.7 billion of total welfare gain with 16.4% of the gain distributed to users. Despite these significant benefits, unleashing private sector investment resources alone can provide only one fourth of the total new capacity needed to build our way out of congestion.
From a financial point of view, it is shown that long-term profitable toll road projects with the expectation of reasonable annual traffic growth do not necessarily guarantee short-term profits. This finding on the Twin Cities network, combined with the existence of multiple private investors, suggests that policy makers do not have to ensure early profitability of private toll roads in order to attract private sector investment resources. An important question for both the private and public sector is how to set the optimal level of tolls on private roads, though "optimal" have different meanings for the two players. This study shows that ignoring networkwide substitutional and complementary effects can cause the private investor to charge overly high tolls that work against profit maximization. However, an adaptive learning process can be adopted by the private investor to quickly find the profit-maximizing toll.
A somewhat surprising conclusion is that even a policy package with minimum regulation on private infrastructure investments could work very well on real world networks. The simulated 18.2% rate of investment return without regulation is actually very close to the regulatory objectives for several private toll road projects in the US (18% for Dulles Greenway, and 18.5% for California SR-125). However, at this rate of investment return, there would be a disproportional and undesirable distribution of benefits between private investors and all road users. Future research may extend the models developed in this paper to assess various regulatory packages and/or contracting options that can improve equity.
Although the analysis of this paper focuses on using private sector investment resources to provide new highway facilities, there is also another form of road privatization gaining popularity in the U.S. -Leasing the existing highways to the private sector for a lump sum payment with long concession periods (e.g. the Chicago Skyway, the Indiana Toll Road System, and currently under consideration, the Illinois Tollway and New Jersey Turnpike). The same modeling framework in this paper may be extended to analyze welfare and financial issues of these long term leases of public roads to the private sector.
In terms of methodology, a traditional approach in transportation economics is followed, which suggests theoretical analysis on small networks before the analysis is extended to applications on real-world networks. Both an equilibrium model and an evolutionary model are developed, which capture the price, capacity, and ownership dynamics on mixed-ownership networks. The later is applicable to real-world policy analysis. Both models could be improved to consider user heterogeneity, product differentiation, and dynamic tolls.
